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We discuss the goals and means of positive decision theory and the implications for
how to do decision theory. We argue that the goal of positive economic theory generally
is to provide predictions and understanding and that representation theorems and other
results of decision theory should be seen as ways to achieve these goals. We also argue that
the “story” of a model is relevant to whether and how we use the model, that psychological
considerations are not necessary for useful decision theory but can be helpful, and that
nonchoice data, interpreted properly, can be valuable in predicting choice and so should
not be ignored.Whatever it is, I’m against it.
— Sung by Groucho Marx in Horsefeathers.
1 Introduction
In recent years, a basic building block of economics — the theory of individual decision
making — has become the renewed focus of an enormous amount of research and recon-
sideration from many di erent perspectives. In decision theory, originally the center of
such research, the insights of Allais (1953) and Ellsberg (1961, 2001), followed up by the
work of Machina (1982), Schmeidler (1989), and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) led to a
complete reconsideration of the classical notion of expected utility and subjective proba-
bility.1 This research inﬂuenced and was inﬂuenced by the experimental and theoretical
work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and many others in psychology who pushed for
an even more fundamental reconsideration of how people make economic decisions. The
latter research fed into work in economics by Laibson, Rabin, and others, who developed
the behavioral approach to economics. In the same period, Rubinstein began the devel-
opment of formal models which gave voice to the earlier insights of Simon (1955, 1982)
regarding procedural rationality.
The ideas from outside of decision theory have reverberated back to decision the-
ory again, leading to an explosion of research. Recent work has continued to develop
our understanding of issues like ambiguity aversion (see Epstein and Schneider (2003),
Klibano , Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005), Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006),
and Siniscalchi (2009), for example) and has gone further into a reconsideration of more
fundamental notions such as optimization itself (see, for example, Kalai, Rubinstein, and
Spiegler (2002), Manzini and Mariotti (2007), and Rubinstein and Salant (2008)), models
of entirely new issues such as temptation (see Gul and Pesendorfer (2001)), and revisiting
many older concerns such as incompleteness (Bewley (2002), Dubra, Maccheroni, and Ok
(2004), and Eliaz and Ok (2006)) and regret (Hayashi (2008), Sarver (2008), and Stoye
(2008)).
Given this large scale reconsideration, it is perhaps unsurprising that many economists,
including but not limited to decision theorists, are rethinking what decision theory is,
what it can do, and how we should think about it. For a sampling from the wide va-
riety of critical perspectives, see Al–Najjar and Weinstein (forthcoming), Bernheim and
1For a detailed bibliography of the literature, see Wakker (2009). For an excellent introduction, see
Kreps (1988).
1Rangel (2007, 2009, forthcoming), Binmore (2008), Caplin and Schotter (2008), Fuden-
berg (2006), Gilboa (2009), Manski (2009), and the Northwestern workshop on “Decision
Theory and its Discontents” (April 2009, proceedings forthcoming in Economics and Phi-
losophy). Obviously, we cannot summarize such a vast set of ideas and arguments in a
few pages. As should not be surprising given the range of opinions represented in these
papers, we agree with some and strongly disagree with others of the views expressed
therein.
Making an assessment of decision theory more di cult is the fact that it has never
been an entirely uniﬁed ﬁeld. Some work in decision theory has been motivated by essen-
tially normative questions such as characterizing how a “rational” decision maker should
act. Other work takes an entirely positive or predictive approach, seeking convenient
modeling tools for summarizing real behavior, rational or not. Of course, there is an
overlap with normative/prescriptive modeling — properties of behavior which we believe
to be normatively desirable and relatively easy for people to do may also be sensible
predictions.
In this paper, we discuss our views of decision theory and what it can contribute to
economic theory. We almost entirely focus on positive theories, commenting brieﬂy at
the end on normative considerations.
In a nutshell, we argue that the goal of positive economic theory is to provide useful
predictions and ways to understand the world, these goals being related but not identical.
We distinguish between the “story” of a model and its predictions, arguing that the story
need not be literally true for the model to be useful. However, conﬁdence in the story of
the model may give us more conﬁdence in its predictions and so is not irrelevant. Also,
the story a ects our intuitions about the model and hence whether and how we use it.
Unfortunately, in seeking to develop a “good” model, one runs into some di cult
tradeo s, the resolution of which will typically depend on the speciﬁc goals of the modeler.
For example, a theory which helps us understand one particular issue better will often
necessarily oversimplify other issues. The net result may lower predictive power in the
short run. On the other hand, as we come to understand the new issue better, we may
be able to model it in ways which allow greater complexity on other dimensions, thus
giving us greater predictive power than before.2
When it comes to normative theories, we need more than good prediction. We cannot
avoid the much more di cult task of identifying, at least approximately, the motives for
and e ects of choice — a disturbing observation given how di cult prediction is.
2This is not to endorse a view that all problems should be dealt with in a single model, a view we
argue against later.
2In Section 2, we discuss the goals of positive economic theory generally and decision
theory more speciﬁcally. Section 3 turns to a discussion of the kinds of results in decision
theory and what they are intended to accomplish. In Section 4, we consider some of the
implications of the perspective we o er. Section 5 concludes with a brief discussion of
the di culties faced by normative theories, particularly welfare questions.
We close this introduction with caveats. First, we make no claim that our comments
reﬂect anyone’s views other than our own. Second, in writing this paper and rereading
what others have said on these topics, we’ve learned how di cult it is to make broad
methodological statements clearly and succinctly. We apologize if we have unintentionally
distorted anyone’s views and hope that we have made our views clear enough to avoid
misinterpretation. Third, many of the points we make have been made many times
before, too many for us to provide anything close to complete citations. We err on the
side of providing few or no speciﬁc cites on each of these points. Our hope is that our
particular combination of these observations is su ciently idiosyncratic to be worth the
reader’s time. Finally, our goal in this paper is to say something useful both to decision
theorists and to those unfamiliar with decision theory. We hope each audience will be
patient with our comments to the other.
2 Positive Decision Theory: Ends
Unfortunately, discussions of choices between models in economics often focus entirely on
predictions and suggest that our choices between models should be based on refutation
only. That is, we reject the model if and only if its predictions are falsiﬁed by the
data, retaining it as “unrejected” in the meantime. We certainly agree that prediction
is important, indeed central, to theory. On the other hand, we do not believe that the
predictions are the only determinant of the usefulness of a model. In particular, the
“story” the model tells about the world is also important.
As we see it, the purpose of positive economic theory is to provide tools and concepts,
a language, which aids in understanding — that is, explaining what we observe — and
prediction — that is, saying what we expect will happen at some future date or in some
other situation.3 To state our views more concretely, suppose empirical observations or
our intuition about the world suggests the hypothesis that A leads to X where A and
3Much of the work in theory involves results which are primarily about understanding the language
itself better with an indirect, long run view toward understanding the world with the language (e.g.,
equilibrium existence results). While the boundary between understanding the language and under-
standing the world is not always clear, we generally focus here on the latter. This should not be taken
to imply a view that the latter is superior, only that we think its role is more central in the debate
discussed in the introduction.
3X are statements about observable variables.4 We claim that having a model explaining
why A leads to X would be useful above and beyond our conjecture or whatever empirical
observations led to it. By a “model,” we mean a precise, mathematical object which is our
attempt to reﬂect an informal intuition we have about how the world works. Constructing
such a model forces us to deﬁne a mathematical analog to A and X as well as to make
various auxiliary hypotheses relating them. What do we learn from developing such a
model?
First, we may learn things about whether our intuition is ﬂawed or not. For example,
we may ﬁnd that our seemingly sensible intuition of why A leads to X actually requires
an additional, unpalatable assumption of B, leading us to question whether our initial
conjecture is sensible. Alternatively, perhaps the model also implies an unexpected and
unpalatable conclusion Y or implies that there is an internal inconsistency in the logic
that A would lead to X.5 On the other hand, we may ﬁnd that only relatively weak and
plausible additional assumptions are required, reinforcing our initial intuition.
Second, we may ﬂesh out our initial intuition in ways that enable additional or better
predictions. For example, if we see that A also leads to an unexpected and plausible
implication of Y , then we have a new prediction. Also, if we see that A only leads to X
when some other condition B holds and that A has a di erent implication otherwise, then
we can improve our ability to predict when A will lead to X since we now believe that B
is required. If B is observable, the recognition of its role gives us a di erent prediction
for those out of sample forecasts when A holds and B does not. For example, the initial
discovery of revenue equivalence in independent private value auctions indicated that
some other feature (the B) such as a common–value component is needed to explain the
ubiquity of English auctions (the X).
Finally, even if the model doesn’t immediately change or enlarge our set of predic-
tions, it may yield a clearer understanding of why A might cause X. Why would such
an understanding be useful? We see the primary value of such understanding in the way
it may lead in the long run to more or better predictions. Lest this comment be mis-
interpreted, we emphasize that understanding may involve concepts whose translation
into observables is not direct or immediate. Consequently, in the short run it may be
di cult to know exactly what these predictions might be. Finally, we emphasize that
“prediction” should be broadly understood to mean a perhaps imprecise statement about
a relationship between observable variables. An imperfect example is Spence’s (1973) pa-
per on job market signaling. While he did provide the new prediction that, controlling
4Our arguments also naturally apply to other kinds of hypotheses. For example, we may instead
hypothesize that A and X are correlated because of some (possibly unobservable) common cause Z.
5Paul Krugman gives a good illustration of this in his ﬁrst Lionel Robbins lecture in June 2009:
“What I did at the time, a very economist thing to do, was to build myself a little model to prove the
point that I believed. So I built a little intertemporal optimizing whatever and to my shock — and this
is the point, of course, of doing models — it actually gave me the opposite answer.”
4for human capital, workers with higher education would receive higher wages, the greater
contribution of the paper seems to be in generating an understanding of signaling that
ultimately led to many other predictions in other environments.
Thus in developing a model, we want it to have predictions about observable variables,
either immediately or eventually. If we learn that these predictions are highly inaccurate,
we should abandon the model. However, viewing model selection as only a matter of
refutation leads to some incorrect conclusions. For one thing, “understanding” is a
goal about eventual predictions, so we certainly cannot evaluate the accuracy of these
predictions in the short run. But the problem with viewing refutation as our sole criteria
for model selection has problems that go quite beyond this consideration.
For example, an exclusive focus on refutation leads to the conclusion that two models
with the same set of predictions are “equivalent” and hence we cannot have any reason
to prefer one over the other. By deﬁnition, two models with the same set of predictions
are equivalent in terms of the conditions under which they are refuted. But we can still
have strong reasons for favoring one model over the other. Many of these reasons have
to do with the “story” of the model — the informal interpretation of the mathematics.
Consider, for example, the theory of subjective expected utility. The story of this
model is that the agent forms subjective probability beliefs about whatever uncertainty
he faces and chooses that action which maximizes expected utility as computed with
these beliefs. To us, this story seems very idealized but intuitive at a certain basic level.
While we don’t believe this story is literally true, the idea that agents have beliefs of some
kind which guide their choices, that they choose actions they consider are more likely
to work out well, etc., seems very natural. Furthermore, even if we dismiss the story as
plausible at all, it is a story that is very handy for our reasoning process. That is, it is
useful to organize our thinking around ideas like beliefs, information, expectations, and
the other concepts suggested by this model.
Since models don’t simply sit on a shelf but are to be used, tractability is valu-
able. For example, a model may be taken to new domains to generate new predic-
tions/understanding. While the story isn’t the sole determinant of tractability, having a
nice intuition about the story facilitates the use of the model. Similarly, a more intuitive
model is likely to be more valuable in helping us understand the world.6
To see the point, suppose we had a black box which, when input a choice set, etc.,
would immediately tell us the agent’s choice from that set. E.g., in a game, we could
input the behavior of the opponents and it would give the response. Even if this predicts
6In line with our argument that understanding is about the eventual development of predictions, one
could say that this second aspect is really a repetition of the ﬁrst and/or referring to having a larger set
of predictions in the long run.
5perfectly, it’s not clear how useful it is. For example, we couldn’t use this to compute an
optimal mechanism since without understanding the structure of the function describing
this agent, we’d have to search over every possible mechanism. Hence even a ﬂawed
intuition might be more useful. In short, general principles, even ones which are not
entirely accurate, may be more comprehensible and hence more useful than very detailed
and accurate speciﬁcations. Thus we see that not only may there be reasons to select
among models with the same predictions, these factors may lead one to prefer a model
with worse predictions.
Once we consider comparisons of models with di erent predictions, we see another
problem with viewing refutation as the only way to select among models. Economists
have limited data and need to make predictions, not just to determine asymptotically
whether the model is right, but because of the need to choose policies or other actions.
When one recognizes the need to choose among models with di erent predictions before
the relevant data arrives, one sees again the value of “intuition.” As Kreps (1990) argues,
consistency of the model with our intuition about how the world works can be thought of
as another kind of consistency with data. If we had to choose between the predictions of
two models that are equally consistent with the data we have, we would prefer to predict
with the model that ﬁts our intuition better.7
We note that this use of intuition is di erent from that emphasized earlier and may
even conﬂict. Earlier, we argued that a more intuitive model would be easier to extend
to new domains. If a model tells an intuitive story which we know to be false, the
intuitiveness of the story can still be very valuable in this sense. For example, as argued
above, a skeptic about the story of subjective expected utility may still ﬁnd that the
intuition of the story makes it easy to use the model. By contrast, here we refer to the
case where a model tells a story which is intuitive in the sense that it seems plausibly
true. While that story may be complicated in ways which make the model harder to work
with, the plausibility of the story may enhance our conﬁdence in the model’s predictions.
To introduce a ﬁnal concern with an exclusive focus on refutation in assessing models,
we emphasize an obvious but important point: a model is never a completely accurate
description of the world. Having a model which is exactly correct would require the
model to be as complex as the world, something about as useful as a map with a scale
of “1 inch = 1 inch.”8 Less facetiously, all understanding is generated by deciding which
7Gul and Pesendorfer (2008) argue forcefully that the implausibility of the story of a model cannot
refute the model. We entirely agree. However, the implausibility may make us less conﬁdent in the
predictions of the model.
8According to Wikipedia, this idea originated in Lewis Carroll’s 1893 Sylvie and Bruno Concluded,
though other readers may recognize it from Jorge Luis Borges’ 1946 short story “Del Rigor en la Ciencia”
(“The Rigors of Science”), Umberto Eco’s essay “On the Impossibility of Drawing a Map of the Empire
on a Scale of 1 to 1” in his 1995 book How to Travel with a Salmon and Other Essays, or a joke by
Steven Wright.
6aspects of reality to ignore. The world never repeats exactly the same situation twice, so
if all aspects of reality are relevant, it is impossible to learn from one situation how to
predict what will happen in another.
Thus almost every model is refuted if we deﬁne refutation in the strictest sense of
the term. To see the implication of this, consider again our discussion of a model of
above regarding how A might imply X. We noted that the model might tell us that this
intuitive story, once formalized, has the additional, unexpected, prediction of Y . Suppose
that Y is something absurd, violated either by repeated observation or simply intuitively
implausible. Does this mean we reject the model?
Not necessarily. We know that our model is unrealistically simple. Hence we should
not be surprised to ﬁnd some odd implications popping up in the model — either odd
predictions about other issues such as Y or excessively extreme predictions about the
magnitude of the e ect of A on X. The key question is whether we believe that the
simpliﬁcations which led to the odd predictions are crucial to the model’s explanation of
why A leads to X. If so, we should conclude the model is inadequate in providing such an
explanation, undermining our conﬁdence in its predictions more broadly. Depending on
whether we continue to believe our original hypothesis about the relationship between A
and X, we would reconsider either the formalization of our idea or the idea itself. On the
other hand, if the simpliﬁed aspects of the model which lead to implausible predictions
are not important to our explanation for the relationship between A and X, then it
seems reasonable to continue to use the model as a working hypothesis for formulating
predictions about A and X, at least qualitatively.
In the end, choices between models will hinge on a number of considerations. In
addition to consistency with data, we value intuitive appeal (in both senses discussed
above), tractability, and the range of additional predictions/understanding the model
generates, several of which depend at least in part on the story of the model. Hence
the choice of a model will depend on the purpose the model is used for, the modeler’s
intuition, and the modeler’s subjective judgement of plausibility. Since all of these things
vary across economists and between economists and psychologists, it should not surprise
us to see di erent models chosen by di erent social scientists, especially if they wish to
focus on di erent aspects of the issue at hand.9 To be clear, we agree with the importance
of minimizing the role of subjective judgements to the extent possible and are not arguing
that all intuitions are equally valid. One economist may reject another’s intuition and,
ultimately, the marketplace of ideas will make some judgements. (Given the amount
of market failure in this context, perhaps a sociological notion is more apt than our
economic metaphor.)
9We are not experts on the philosophy of science, but our understanding is that the unavoidability
of subjective judgements in science is widely acknowledged there.
7Now we specialize our discussion by turning to decision theory more speciﬁcally.
Before explaining the motivation for the approach decision theory takes, we ﬁrst explain
what it does. Decision theory provides a formalization of certain intuitive ideas about
decision making and relates these to potentially observable choice behavior. Typically,
decision theory develops a “model” in the form of a utility function (or a class of utility
functions, e.g., expected utility) which is used to predict choice behavior.10
For example, suppose we want to model agents who su er from “temptation.” The
ﬁrst step is to identify the behavior that we think corresponds to our intuitive notion of
temptation. This step, giving “temptation” a behavioral deﬁnition, is in many ways the
crux of what decision theory does — see Section 4.3 for more on this point. Since it would
be too di cult to work with a model that assumes only this behavioral deﬁnition, we add
some assumptions on behavior that simplify and either seem plausibly true or at least
plausibly unrelated to the issue of temptation. We then relate these assumptions to a
particular functional form for the utility function. This result thus identiﬁes a functional
form that we can think of as a useful formal embodiment of our intuitive notion of
temptation.
Decision theory is used for a range of purposes, from predictions about individual
choice (as in demand theory) to being an ingredient in a much larger model. For an
example focused on individual choice, we might use the model of temptation to analyze
how demand functions are a ected by temptation. For an example of using decision
theory as an ingredient, suppose we observe that the addition of dessert items by a
restaurant leads to a short–run increase in sales, followed by a severe downturn. Suppose
we hypothesize that people are surprised by the tempting items at ﬁrst and give in
to temptation, but afterward avoid these restaurants. Then we can use our model of
temptation as an ingredient in analyzing this question.
To relate decision theory to our earlier discussion of prediction and our “A implies
X” story most simply, think of the A as some statement of the choice situation an agent
faces — for example, the set of available options. Think of the X as a statement about
the choice made — for example, that the agent purchases insurance. Then much of our
discussion of prediction above carries over directly to decision theory. Just as in the
general case, we may wish to understand why the agent purchases insurance. A trivial
explanation is that he just likes to buy insurance policies, but a fuller and therefore
10For simplicity, throughout this paper, we will describe a model in decision theory in terms of utility
functions. However, classic models in decision theory also include other objects such as subjective
probabilities. Recent models have introduced many other approaches to representing behavior. For
example, the agent is represented with more than one utility function in the literature on temptation
(Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2009)) and incomplete preferences (Dubra,
Maccheroni, and Ok (2004)) and with a set of probabilities in the literature on ambiguity (Bewley (2002),
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)). Another type of model involves criteria which eliminate certain options
before applying utility maximization (Eliaz and Spiegler (2008), Manzini and Mariotti (2007)).
8more appealing explanation is that insurance reduces risk and the agent values it for this
reason. We then employ decision theory to deﬁne notions of risk and risk aversion in
order to formalize this explanation. This can be useful for many reasons. For example,
our intuition about why the agent buys insurance may lead us to make other predictions
about his behavior — e.g., investment decisions. More generally, we take “axioms” or
properties of his choice behavior in a certain domain, assume they hold more broadly, and
use this to predict choices on a larger domain. As in our discussion of positive economics,
the model may lead to predictions about other variables, show unexpected problems with
our reasoning, etc.
As we discussed earlier, what data leads us to reject a model is a subtle question.
To explain the point, return to the insurance example above. We suggested that an
intuitive explanation of the observation of an agent purchasing insurance is that he is
averse to risk and buys insurance to reduce his risk. We might then adopt the simplest
approach to formalizing this explanation, assuming that we can write utility as a function
of money only, assuming the agent maximizes expected utility, deﬁning risk and risk
aversion in this context, and assuming that the risk aversion property holds globally.
This yields a simple, intuitive model with many predictions. Suppose that our goal
with this model is to make predictions about the agent’s other insurance purchases. For
example, perhaps our initial observation concerned the purchase of house insurance and
we wish to predict choices regarding car and boat insurance. If our predictions of these
decisions are reasonably accurate, then we should not be too troubled by the observation
that the agent occasionally plays poker with his friends, even though this contradicts the
joint hypothesis that utility depends only on money and that the agent is globally risk
averse. We would argue this is not troubling for two reasons. First, we know that our
hypothesis that the agent cares only about the amount of money he has is a simpliﬁcation
and that we could easily change that assumption to incorporate the utility of games with
friends to reconcile the model with this observation. Second, the poker games were not
our focus in constructing the model, so inaccuracy in that dimension is not costly. Thus
we would not bother to address this observation.11
Similarly, if we have data which refutes an auxiliary assumption of the model, this
need not be a reason to abandon the model. For example, suppose we have evidence
that the agents whose behavior we are studying do not maximize expected utility, but
the model still does a good job of predicting insurance decisions. Since this data does
not refute the predictions of the model, we see no reason to abandon it, though this
may shake our conﬁdence in its predictions. Of course, our conﬁdence in the predictions
would be enhanced if we knew it were possible to modify the expected utility model to
generate the same predictions about insurance and avoid refutation by other data.
11Of course, if the original model is consistent with the agent’s poker playing, this is only mild support
for the model for the same reasons.
9A perhaps more controversial point is that even if we are initially making poor predic-
tions about insurance choices, this might not lead us to abandon our general explanation
based on risk aversion, though it forces us to revise our speciﬁc model. For example, if we
used expected utility and we ﬁnd that choices of insurance similar to those generating the
Allais paradox are causing our model to mispredict, we may ﬁnd that we can switch to
a generalized expected utility model a la Machina (1982) with risk aversion and predict
quite well. The observation of Allais type behavior leads us to drop the expected utility
aspect of our model, but if our main idea was about risk aversion, not expected utility,
this change is not saying the original insight was “wrong.”
As this discussion highlights, part of the problem with a focus on refutation is that
almost any phenomenon can be explained in almost any broadly deﬁned class of models
by “tweaking” the model appropriately. If we can deﬁne the set of factors which inﬂuence
the utility of the agent any way we like, can deﬁne how the objects in the world map into
these factors any way we like, and can choose any functional form we like, surely we can
rationalize any set of data.
So when would we abandon our explanation of why A leads to X? The point is that
if we have to do a huge number and variety of tweaks, then the resulting model loses all
the properties we said were valuable. It ceases to be tractable. It ceases to be intuitive.
Unless our new situation is very close to the data our model has been constructed to
ﬁt, we lose the ability to make out of sample predictions with any degree of conﬁdence.
At this point, we conclude that we need a better model, presumably one based on a
completely di erent explanation of the behavior we observe.
To be clear, it is valuable when a single model is consistent with a wide variety
of empirical observations. However, when a model achieves this consistency only by
adding a tweak or an additional parameter for each data point, then the model adds no
understanding and is unlikely to predict well (except in situations that are very close to
our past observations). The only valuable version of a model with such breadth is one
which explains a variety of observations with a small number of basic principles.12
3 Positive Decision Theory: Means
Broadly speaking, there are two branches of work in positive decision theory. One group
of papers (see, for example, Gollier (2001) and the references therein) develops new tools,
e.g., di erent measures of risk, for working with existing models. The other, which we
focus on henceforth, develops new models to introduce new considerations to economics.
For example, Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa–Schmeidler (1989) introduced the notion of
12This is reminiscent of the way Copernicus’ model of astronomy replaced the Ptolemaic model.
10ambiguity aversion where agents prefer risks based on known probabilities to those based
on unknown, a phenomenon impossible in the usual subjective expected utility model.
The usual approach in the development of new models is not to start from scratch but
instead to generalize existing models to allow the new possibility under consideration.
As discussed above, one identiﬁes the behavior that is intuitively associated with the
new issue to be introduced. Since the new behavior is, by hypothesis, inconsistent with
standard models, this requires modifying some of the standard assumptions. Typically,
one drops as little of the standard assumptions as possible, retaining the rest of the
standard assumptions for the purposes of simpliﬁcation as discussed earlier. This is also
useful because it makes it easier to connect the new ideas to the existing literature to see
how the model with the “new” ingredient changes our understanding from what we had
before.
A related methodological consideration is that we do not consider multiple new in-
gredients at the same time. For example, we have mentioned temptation and ambiguity
aversion as new ingredients that have been added in recent years. Yet the models which
introduced temptation did not include the previously added ingredient of ambiguity aver-
sion. Why not? The point is that these seem like conceptually distinct issues. If so, then
the simplest way to achieve understanding of these two issues would be to ﬁrst under-
stand each in isolation. If we realize some connection between the two issues, perhaps
because some phenomenon of interest stems from the interaction of them, then and only
then would a model that combines these new ingredients be of interest.
Kreps (1990) provides a useful analogy (which he attributes to Jose Scheinkman). He
notes the usual joke about how the economist looks for his keys under the streetlight not
because that’s where he lost them but because “the light is better.” He suggests that
we should think instead of progress in theory as putting together a series of lights from
where the light is good already to where we think the keys are. We agree, but would
extend the analogy. The point is that we also need to consider what direction to move the
light. I.e., we begin by moving in the direction of adding temptation or in the direction
of adding ambiguity aversion but not both together. If moving in one direction works,
we’ll “ﬁnd the keys.” If not, this means there is an interaction between these issues that
is important and we’ll have to learn to understand that interaction and move in that
direction to ﬁnd the keys.
Turning to speciﬁcs, most theorems in decision theory are about the following issues:
1. What is the behavior corresponding to a particular functional form?
2. To what extent does the behavior in question identify parameters in the function?
3. How do intuitive changes in the behavior correspond to changes in the parameters?
11The ﬁrst kind of result is called a representation theorem since it shows that a partic-
ular functional form represents (corresponds to) certain behavior. We refer to the second
kind of result, for obvious reasons, as an identiﬁcation theorem or a uniqueness result.
Finally, we refer to the last kind of result as a comparative or comparative static.
3.1 Representation Theorems
A representation theorem relates a model of decision making (a class of utility functions)
to properties of the implied choices. The latter is usually stated in one of two forms.
First, it may be stated as a choice function or correspondence — that is, a speciﬁcation
of the item(s) the agent would choose as a function of the feasible set. Second, it may be
stated as a preference relation — that is, a statement about which object (if either) the
agent would prefer from any given pair of objects.13 For our purposes, positive decision
theory, the notion of preference should be interpreted as revealed preference. In other
words, a is preferred to b is shorthand for a would be chosen if the available options are
a and b. (Unfortunately, many of the motivations o ered for axioms in the literature
implicitly equate revealed preference with “real” preference.)
A representation theorem says that some utility function in a particular class predicts
the agent’s choices if and only if those choices satisfy certain properties. These proper-
ties are typically referred to as axioms and so representation theorems are often called
axiomatizations.14
What is the purpose of a representation theorem? In a nutshell, the purpose is to
clarify what the model — the functional form for a utility function — predicts. While
we ﬁnd the story of a representation very useful, it does not tell us what the model
predicts. For example, as discussed in the last section, it is common in economic theory
to assume that an agent has subjective probability beliefs and maximizes expected utility
given them. One interpretation of the model takes this literally: agents have probability
beliefs and compute expected utilities with them to make decisions. Since people often
ﬁnd this di cult to do and rarely seem to explicitly follow such a procedure, some skeptics
argue that this theory is simply wrong.
However, as we discussed, the predictions of positive decision theory are predictions of
choice behavior. While the story’s plausibility (or lack thereof) may a ect our conﬁdence
in the predictions of the model, it cannot refute or conﬁrm those predictions.15 The
13This is simply a partial speciﬁcation of a choice correspondence.
14The word “axiom” is somewhat inappropriate for positive models in that it suggests a universally
true principle.
15There is an analogy here to our earlier argument that data refuting an auxiliary assumption in a
model does not necessarily refute the predictions of the model and hence does not refute the model. If we
12contribution of Savage (1954) was to identify the predictions by demonstrating that an
agent whose behavior satisﬁes certain natural and easily interpretable properties would
behave as if she has probability beliefs and computed expected utility.
One reason this is useful is that it can help us ﬁnd and/or understand examples that
show the limitations of the model. As Ellsberg (1961, page 646) put it, one e ect of
Savage’s axioms is that they gave “a useful operational meaning to the proposition that
people do not always assign, or act ‘as though’ they assigned, probabilities to uncertain
events.” In other words, the identiﬁcation of the behavior that corresponds to subjective
expected utility also identiﬁes the behavior that does not correspond to the theory. By
thinking about the limitations of Savage’s axioms, Ellsberg (1961) was led to identify
an example of natural and plausible behavior which was inconsistent with subjective
expected utility.16 By doing so, Ellsberg identiﬁed both a set of circumstances under
which Savage’s theory is unlikely to predict well and pointed to the behavior which
alternative models would need to address.
Relatedly, if we want to test a model, it may be easier to test behavioral implications
directly rather than to estimate a general functional form representation and see if the
estimated function is in the class corresponding to the model. This is particularly true if
we want to be sure to test the parts of the model we take seriously, not the parts we view
as a convenient but inaccurate simpliﬁcation. If we reject a functional form, it can be
di cult to say whether this is because of the inaccuracies of the convenient simpliﬁcation
or the essence of the model. If we directly test the key behavioral predictions instead,
we don’t have this problem.
Another illustration of the value of a representation theorem is provided by Masatli-
oglu and Ok (2009). The classic loss aversion and reference dependence model discussed
in Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and developed further in Tversky and Kahneman
(1991, 1992) was motivated in part by the idea of the endowment e ect where the agent
is biased in favor of the status quo. Speciﬁcally, Tversky and Kahenman (1991) note
the evidence of Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) and the property they term status quo
bias: if an agent is indi erent between x and y when z is the status quo, then he should
strictly prefer x to y when x is the status quo. However, Masatlioglu and Ok (2009) show
by example that a commonly used version of the functional form proposed by Tversky
and Kahenman (1992) used does not satisfy this property.
We do not mean to argue that this property is necessary for a model of reference
think of the procedural story of subjective expected utility as analogous to an “auxiliary assumption,”
we see that the failure of this assumption does not refute the theory. On the other hand, as we argued
before, such refutation may lessen one’s conﬁdence in the predictions of the model.
16To be fair, Ellsberg did not immediately recognize the sure–thing principle as the key to the issue.
Indeed, he comments (Ellsberg (2001), footnote 2, page 244) that he was “considerably surprised” to
realize this was the axiom he was questioning.
13dependence to be interesting. Instead, our point is simply that without a representation
theorem that clearly identiﬁes the behavior implied by the model and how it relates to
the properties the model is intended to capture, a researcher who adopts the model with
the goal of generating the relevant behavior would not know whether he succeeded.
The discussion so far only demonstrates the role of necessity, not su ciency.A
representation theorem proves that behavior satisﬁes certain properties if and only if it
is the result of maximizing a utility function in a certain class. Thus these properties
of behavior are necessary and su cient for the representation. Typically, proving the
behavioral properties are necessary (implied by the representation) is very easy — it is
not unusual for this part of a proof to be omitted because it is trivial. On the other
hand, the su ciency part of the proof (showing that the behavioral properties imply the
representation) is often quite di cult.
Yet the justiﬁcations above really only show value to the easy part. To see this,
suppose we have a property which we only know is necessary for the functional form
and don’t know whether it is su cient. If we observe behavior inconsistent with this
necessary property, then we reject the model. Similarly, if we understand the intuitive
limitations of a necessary property, again, this may enable us to identify the limitations
of a model. That is, recognizing that the property conﬂicting with Ellsberg’s example is
the sure–thing principle requires only knowing that the sure–thing principle is necessary.
Finally, it would be enough for our hypothetical researcher to know that a particular
version of the Tversky–Kahneman model implied the status quo bias property.
The su ciency part of a representation theorem is important for several reasons.
First, obviously, if we don’t know all of the implications of a model, we don’t know if we
are seeing behavior consistent with it. For example, if we only knew that expected util-
ity requires that preferences be transitive and continuous but did not realize it requires
the independence axiom, we might fail to realize that the Allais paradox behavior con-
tradicts expected utility theory. Without knowing that the behavior we have identiﬁed
is su cient, we can never know whether there is a necessary property, perhaps a very
undesirable one, that we have failed to identify.17
The importance of knowing we have all the implications is particularly clear when the
story of the model is potentially misleading about its predictions. For example, in the
multiple priors model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), the agent has a set of probability
beliefs instead of a single belief. In evaluating a given course of action, he uses the “worst
17On the other hand, it is worth noting that even if we know the necessary and su cient conditions
for a representation, we may miss important behavioral implications. There could easily be some subtle
implication of a combination of two or more axioms that we do not recognize simply by examining the
axioms in isolation. There are inﬁnitely many ways to express the behavioral implications of any model
and part of the art of axiomatization is bringing out the key implications in the clearest possible way.
See Section 4.3.
14case” expected utility across the beliefs in his set. Thus the model seems to describe an
extraordinarily pessimistic agent. Yet the axioms that characterize behavior in this model
do not have this feature. Instead, the key axiom just says that the agent only satisﬁes
the independence axiom on a restricted domain, an axiom we ﬁnd quite natural. The
su ciency theorem ensures that there is not some hidden pessimism requirement that we
haven’t identiﬁed yet. Similarly, the minimax regret model assumes that agents derive
disutility from choosing an action and later realizing that a di erent action would have
been better. Thus the story of the model seems to require the agent to know he will
later learn which action would have been best. Yet the axiomatizations of Milnor (1954),
Stoye (2008), or Hayashi (2008) identify very natural properties of choice which do not
require such ex post observation in any way. See Schlag (2006) for further discussion.18
Second, recall our discussion of developing a model of temptation in Section 2. We
noted that one proposes a behavioral deﬁnition of the phenomenon of interest (temptation
in the example), adds some convenient simplifying assumptions, and derives a model
which corresponds to that behavior. This development is entirely about the su ciency
part of a representation proof. It is the su ciency argument which enables us to say that
the representation is the more tractable embodiment of our notion of temptation.
Third, su ciency clariﬁes the links between observables. To see the idea, consider
the Koszegi and Rabin (2006) model of reference dependence which is based on the
Kahneman–Tversky model of loss aversion. Koszegi and Rabin extend the model to
lotteries and show that the properties identiﬁed by Bowman, Minehart, and Rabin (1999)
imply a weak form of status quo bias (if x is preferred to y when y is the status quo,
then x is preferred to y when x is the status quo). They also use the model in some
economic contexts to demonstrate other results such as a novel explanation for sales. In
other words, a particular representation implies the weak status quo bias and also implies
the role for sales. Does this mean that weak status quo bias is a key element of their
explanation for sales? Without a su ciency result, it is impossible to say. We don’t
know whether the weak status quo bias (with some auxiliary assumptions) implies the
role for sales or conversely or perhaps both follow from a third behaviorally identiﬁed
property. By contrast, suppose there was a su ciency theorem for this model. Then we
would know that weak status quo bias (plus some other auxiliary assumptions) implies
this representation of the agent which implies the role for sales. In this sense, we would
know that weak status quo bias is the key to the result.19
18Interestingly, Sarver’s (2008) axiomatization of a di erent regret model seems (to us) most naturally
interpreted as assuming ex post observation.
19This argument does not imply that the su ciency analysis must be in the form of a representation
theorem. If one takes the basic loss aversion model as the auxiliary hypothesis and proves that weak
status quo bias holds if (and not just only if as in Koszegi–Rabin) the functional form restrictions of
Bowman, Minehart, and Rabin are satisﬁed, then one can make the same argument that a representation
theorem would allow. On the other hand, we ﬁnd auxiliary assumptions in the form of axioms easier to
assess than auxiliary assumptions of a functional form.
15Finally, since we do not have the data to distinguish models perfectly, one way to
enhance our trust in a model is to see that its results are robust. That is, if we ﬁnd that
a particular conclusion proven for one class of models also holds when we enlarge the
set of allowed models, then we have more conﬁdence in this conclusion. Of course, our
conﬁdence is enlarged more if the enlarged set of models is “bigger.” Conversely, if we ﬁnd
that a “small” change in a model leads some conclusions to fail, then we are less conﬁdent
in those conclusions. Clearly, to consider such issues, we need some way to measure the
size of changes in models. Since changes in models typically involve non–nested changes
in functional forms, there is rarely a parameter whose change measures the change in the
model. Even when models are nested, it is hard to know how behaviorally signiﬁcant
a given change in a parameter really is. If we know the behavior in question, though,
we can assess this. For example, suppose we learn that a conclusion which holds when
preferences satisfy the independence axiom continues to hold when we relax independence
to betweenness (Chew (1983), Dekel (1986)). That is, the property does not require both
parallel and linear indi erence curves, just the linearity. This gives us a clear sense of
the degree of robustness being demonstrated.20
We are not arguing that representation theorems are the only tool for achieving a
useful understanding of our models. In our view, behavioral economics and decision
theory are di erent approaches with similar but not identical purposes. The work we
ﬁnd most interesting in both areas notes some observations that are di cult or impossible
to explain with existing models, proposes some alternative model which has an interesting
interpretation in light of the observations, and then provides some means to understand
the alternative. The means and ends di er and we see advantages to each approach.
Starting with what we prefer about the decision theorist’s approach, it generally takes
the form of a complete characterization of the model, clarifying both its general predic-
tions and the nature of the simpliﬁcations used. By contrast, behavioral economists
typically omit any analog of the su ciency results we argued above are important. In-
deed, many papers don’t provide much in the way of general necessary conditions either,
making it hard to see what the model says about individual choice aside from the stories
one can tell about the representation. Decision theorists typically tell stories about their
representations as well, but provide clariﬁcation via a representation theorem. There are
notable exceptions to this critique. Koszegi–Rabin (2006)21 and Eliaz–Spiegler (2008), for
example, show several interesting implications (i.e., necessary conditions) of the general
functional form. We wish more papers in behavioral economics did likewise.22
20To be fair, it is sometimes possible to study robustness via the functional form as in Machina (1982).
21Some of Koszegi and Rabin’s implications are about observable variables only if we assume the
reference point is observable. In their model, reference points are derived endogenously and equal the
agent’s expected choice, so they are potentially observable.
22See Spiegler (2008) for a similar argument in favor of a more systematic exploration of the implica-
tions of new models.
16In favor of the behavioral approach, it clariﬁes our understanding of the new model
via some exploration of what the model does in a simple economic environment. By
contrast, the decision theorist’s analysis is typically carried out in a simpler context than
the setting in which we hope to use the model. For example, one normally considers
axioms in a single–agent setting and often only in the static case, even though many
of the applications of interest have many agents and important dynamic considerations.
The behaviorial economist’s use of less stark environments means that the economic
implications of the model are often more clearly developed than in typical papers in
decision theory.
Thus we reject the argument that either approach is inherently superior to the other.
Indeed, we think these approaches should be seen as complements, not substitutes. While
we have generally taken one of these approaches in our own work, this reﬂects a combi-
nation of historical accidents and comparative advantage (or comparative disadvantage
as the case may be), not a view that only one approach is legitimate.
Relatedly, representation theorems are not always essential. While we see represen-
tation theorems as a valuable way to understand models better, we could ﬁnd a model
worth exploring further even before it has been axiomatized. Also, there are cases where
the behavioral meaning of the model is su ciently obvious that an explicit representation
theorem adds little. For example, in a model of utility of money, the assumption that
u  > 0 has a very obvious meaning without having to restate this in the language of
preferences. Similarly, as discussed above, much of behavioral economics o ers a func-
tional form instead of axioms. In some cases, the translation of this functional form into
the behavior it predicts is su ciently obvious that this does not seem unreasonable. In
such cases, we can think of the functional form itself as the axiom, so a representation
theorem is not needed. In other cases, it is very di cult to see what this “axiom” says,
so we would prefer “real” axioms.
Not only is axiomatization not necessary for a model to be interesting, it is certainly
not su cient. A model that is intractable, complex, unintuitive, and makes lousy pre-
dictions may have an axiomatization, but we wouldn’t want to use the model anyway.
3.2 Identiﬁcation Theorems and Comparatives
One point which seems not well understood outside the decision theory community (and
perhaps not inside some parts of it either) is the importance of identiﬁcation. A model is
supposed to be an intuitive and simpliﬁed description of some aspect of reality. The pur-
pose of decision theory is to understand this model and the behavior it predicts/describes.
One key to doing so is to determine the extent to which the objects in the representa-
tion can be pinned down from the agent’s behavior and, in this sense, given behavioral
17meaning. If the objects in the representation cannot be given such meaning, then the
model is, at best, loosely connected to what it is supposed to be describing and, at worst,
misleading.
For example, consider state–dependent expected utility. This is a model where the
utility function depends on what is consumed but also on the state of the world. It is
well–known that we cannot identify subjective probabilities separately from utilities in
such models. To see this, suppose there are two states, s1 and s2. The agent is represented
via an evaluation of acts, functions which say what the agent gets in states s1 and s2.
Suppose the agent’s preferences over such acts can be represented by (1/4)u(f(s1),s 1)+
(3/4)u(f(s2),s 2). That is, if the agent chooses act f, he is interpreted as receiving
outcome f(s1) in state s1, generating utility u(f(s1),s 1) and analogously in state s2. His
subjective probabilities are that state s1 has probability 1/4, while s2 has probability
3/4. It is easy to see that the choices predicted by this model would be the same as those














since this is another way of writing the same function. Deﬁne v(x,s1) = (1/2)u(x,s1) and
v(x,s2) = (3/2)u(x,s2). Then we are saying that the agent with utility function u with
subjective probabilities (1/4,3/4) is indistinguishable from an agent with utility function
v and subjective probabilities (1/2,1/2). Intuitively, if we see that the agent pays more
attention to outcomes in one state than outcomes in the other, we can’t tell if this is
because his utility function is more sensitive in that state or because he considers that
state more likely. Thus, as in the u+r example, the issue is that we cannot behaviorally
identify one object separately from the other.
The usual approach for dealing with objects that cannot be behaviorally separated
is to adopt a normalization for one object that yields (conditional) identiﬁcation for the
other. In the case of state–dependent utilities, we could normalize the probabilities to a
uniform distribution or, equivalently, simply omit the probabilities altogether and work
with the sum of the utilities. Note that this normalization means that the probabilities
then do not have any meaning — it cannot be signiﬁcant to say that the probabilities
are uniform when we have to normalized them to be so. Other normalizations leave some
ﬂexibility for both objects, so both can have some meaning.
For an example of such a normalization, one which is very useful, consider the state–
independent model. This is a case where an additional behavioral property, called state
independence by Anscombe and Aumann (1963), implies that there is a normalization
available where the utility function u is independent of the state. This is still a normal-
ization in the sense that there will be state–dependent models that are equivalent. In
particular, we have not proved that the utilities are state–independent; we have normal-
18ized to make them so.23 However, this is a normalization which has a nice intuition and
is useful.
To see how this can be useful, suppose we have a representation with a state inde-
pendent u and we know that the agent is weakly risk averse. One can deﬁne this from
the preferences but for brevity, we focus on an equivalent statement in terms of u —
namely, that u is weakly concave.24 A standard result for this kind of model implies the
following. If we compare two acts f and g such that the distribution of outcomes under f
(given the subjective probabilities) is a mean–preserving spread of the distribution under
g, then it must be true that g is weakly preferred to f, denoted g   f.
Suppose, however, that we take a di erent normalization. To see the idea, suppose
our initial state independent model has two states, a utility function of u(x)=x, and
probability beliefs (1/4,3/4). Exactly the argument we gave earlier says that this agent’s
behavior would be the same as the behavior of an agent with state–dependent utility
function v(x,s1) = (1/2)x and v(x,s2) = (3/2)x and probabilities (1/2,1/2). Consider
the acts f = (1,1) and g = (0,2). Given the belief (1/2,1/2) that we attribute to
the agent in this state–dependent representation, g is a mean–preserving spread of f
— it has the same expected value but is not constant and hence is riskier. However,
both representations agree on the conclusion that g has strictly higher expected utility
than f. Thus the useful property of the state–independent model doesn’t hold for an
arbitrarily selected but equivalent state–dependent model. Hence the “normalization” of
state independence strikes us as a natural one to adopt. As we argue later, even if there
was some sense in which the “true” representation was not the state independent one,
we’d still prefer this normalization.25
Probably the most familiar illustration of identiﬁcation is when a utility function is
said to be unique up to a monotonic transformation. To see how this relates to our
explanation of identiﬁcation, note that a utility function can only behaviorally identify
when one object is ranked higher than another. Thus the determination of which item
has higher utility is identiﬁed, but the magnitude of the utilities is not. Since a mono-
tonic transformation preserves comparisons but not magnitudes, the “up to a monotonic
transformation” identiﬁcation tells us exactly what is behaviorally meaningful. Many
23This point is made forcefully by Karni (2007), though he takes a very di erent perspective on the
issue.
24The equivalent statement in terms of preferences that we have in mind is for the Anscombe–Aumann
model where the set of “prizes” is R, interpreted as money. We can write any given act f as (fs,f  s)
where fs is the lottery over money in state s and f s is the proﬁle of such lotteries for other states.
Suppose that for every s,( fs,f  s)   (Efs,f  s) for every nondegenerate lottery fs.
25It is worth noting that one can have models where the Anscombe–Aumann state independence
property fails and there is no normalization of utilities for which this result holds. In this sense, even
though we can identify probabilities conditional on a normalization, the identiﬁcation is not as useful in
inherently state–dependent models.
19identiﬁcation statements use this approach of characterizing uniqueness up to an appro-
priate transformation.
One of the key reasons we care about identiﬁcation is that this is crucial to making
comparatives possible. A comparative or comparative static is a result connecting a
change in the representation to a change in the behavior it represents. To see the link to
identiﬁcation, note that identiﬁcation results tell us the extent to which objects in the
representation are behaviorally meaningful. Once we understand this, we can see how
changes in those objects translate into changes in behavior.
Comparative statics enable us to obtain results connecting behavioral properties (e.g.,
attitudes to risk or ambiguity) to observables of interest (e.g., investment or insurance
decisions). Much of the use of decision theory in economics is either directly of this form
or an indirect use where one shows that a particular phenomenon implies a conclusion
which does not hold in its absence.26 A well–known example is the Arrow–Pratt (Arrow
(1971), Pratt (1964)) measure of risk aversion.
One reason we think people sometimes overlook or underrate the importance of iden-
tiﬁcation is that achieving identiﬁcation is not costless. It often requires additional
structure and/or additional assumptions. For example, if the domain a particular utility
function is deﬁned over is too small, then one may not have enough information to iden-
tify aspects of the utility function. Thus it is not unusual for decision theory papers to
consider preferences over large and sometimes complex sets of objects. Relatedly, to de-
velop the kind of structure needed for identiﬁcation often requires stronger assumptions.
Naturally, it seems better to have fewer assumptions and/or to focus on preferences over
simpler and presumably more realistic domains.
As we see it, the key question in whether the use of a particular domain is appropriate
comes down to whether the objects in the domain can be thought of as reasonable
approximations of some actual objects in the world that the agent may consider. For
example, in the Savage model, the objects of choice are functions from an inﬁnite set
of states of the world to an inﬁnite set of consequences. We don’t see real people often
making choices between such functions. On the other hand, we do see people viewing
options they have in the form of “if x happens, then I’ll end up with a, but if y happens,
I’ll get b.” The functions in Savage are just a more formal version of this and so seem
reasonable to us. In proposing a large space for use in identiﬁcation, we think the burden
is on the decision theorist to point to such a correspondence.
When multiple models can be used to represent the same behavior, we have a di erent
kind of identiﬁcation issue.27 When two di erent models correspond to intersecting sets
26The indirect use is also a comparative static in that moving from the absence of the phenomenon to
its presence is equivalent to moving from a “zero level” to a positive one.
27On the other hand, multiple models can be thought of as a special case of an unidentiﬁed parameter
20of behaviors, this should not be a surprise. Intuitively, a given model is like a particular
explanation of the behavior it generates. It is unsurprising that at least some choice
behaviors may have multiple explanations.
Furthermore, multiple explanations may be useful. Di erent explanations will suggest
di erent intuitions, di erent questions to consider, di erent comparatives that might be
useful. For example, we have a model of temptation (Dekel and Lipman (2007)) where the
agent is uncertain about how/whether he will be tempted in the future and believes his
tempted future self will always give in to temptation. We show that the set of preferences
for partial commitments that this model can generate include all preferences generated
by Gul and Pesendorfer’s (2001) temptation model — where the agent knows his future
self’s level of temptation and may expect his future self to exert costly self control.28
To see the idea, consider a dieting agent who can commit himself to a healthy dish h,
commit himself to a fattening dish f, or leave open the choice between the two, denoted
{h,f}. Then it seems natural that we might have {h} { h,f} { f} where {h} denotes
committing to h and {f} is deﬁned similarly. In Gul and Pesendorfer, this preference is
interpreted as saying that the agent knows that if he does not commit to one of the two
dishes, then he will be tempted by f but will manage to consume h at the cost of exerting
self–control, thus leaving him in between the two commitments in utility terms. In Dekel
and Lipman, this preference is interpreted as saying that in the absence of commitment,
the agent gives some probability to sticking with h and some probability of being tempted
away to f, thus ending up in between the other two options in terms of expected utility.
That di erent stories about temptation can overlap on at least some predictions
should surely not surprise us. Yet these two stories are quite di erent and so suggest
di erent applications or questions. For example, Gul and Pesendorfer focus on how we
can identify the self–control costs and how higher costs would a ect behavior, while Dekel
and Lipman focus on the degree of uncertainty about future temptations. Thus we do
not see this overlap as saying anything about which model is more useful or “better.”
4 Implications for How to Do Decision Theory
The perspective on decision theory we have o ered leads to a number of conclusions
about how we should do decision theory, some of which are not entirely standard. In this
in a single model. We can always put two di erent models into a single class by deﬁning the functional
form of   times a function in one class plus 1     times a function in the other. In cases where there is
a function in each class representing the behavior, the   is unidentiﬁed.
28In a richer behavioral domain involving choices under partial commitment instead of choices of such
commitments, the predictions of the models would di er.
21section, we discuss several such issues.
4.1 The Role of Psychology
Some economists seem to reject the notion that psychology could be useful to economics
and decision theory. In many cases, this view revolves around the distinction between
studying the choices people make versus the way people make them. Many economists,
notably Gul and Pesendorfer, have argued that we are only interested in the former.
Others, such as Rubinstein (1998), suggest that the study of choice procedures may yield
better understanding of choice behavior. Yet others, such as Camerer (2008), argue that
while choice, not procedure, is the economist’s traditional focus, this was an unfortunate
compromise forced on the profession in an era when there was no way to observe how
people make choices. These economists argue that with the advent of neuroeconomics,
we can study the brain and its processing of choice problems.
We think that what psychologists are interested in is not always the same as what
economists are interested in, so that it is not necessarily useful to blend the two perspec-
tives. On the other hand, in our view, the real question is whether psychology can help
us generate insights that enable more or better predictions (about variables of interest
to economists) or to do so more easily.29
To begin thinking about this issue, consider again the theory of risk aversion. As
discussed above, the basic idea of taking the concavity of u to represent a property we
call risk aversion seems extremely useful in economic theory. Yet this is very di erent
from the way a psychologist might think about risk aversion. As discussed by Gul and
Pesendorfer (2008), a psychologist (or a neuroeconomist) might focus more on cognitive or
emotional factors, “fear responses,” etc. Thus a psychologist might say that the curvature
of u is unrelated to “true” risk aversion but is instead related to diminishing marginal
utility of money. In our view the fact that the psychologist sees the economist’s model
as wrong hardly trumps all other considerations by itself. Instead, the key questions are
whether the psychologist’s model makes more or better predictions (about the variables
of interest to economists), whether it is easier to work with, etc.
For a more concrete example, recall the second example in Section 3.2 where a prefer-
ence could be represented using a state independent utility function and probability be-
liefs of (1/4,3/4) or a state dependent utility function and probability beliefs of (1/2,1/2).
As we noted, the state independent representation has the nice feature that we can relate
the curvature of the utility function to a theorem on mean–preserving spreads and we do
29We suspect that most economists agree with this point, though they may disagree in evaluating
whether a given paper is successful at this.
22not get this theorem for the equivalent state–dependent model. Suppose a psychologist
could measure “utils” and told us that the person’s utility function was di erent in the
two states, that he genuinely valued consumption in one state three times as much as
consumption in the other state, implying that the person’s “true” probability beliefs were
the ones in the state dependent representation, namely (1/2,1/2). We would argue that
we should ignore the psychological data here since making our model more psychologi-
cally realistic comes at the cost of losing convenient tools. This example illustrates that
psychological realism is not costless, so the relevant consideration should be whether the
costs exceed the beneﬁts.
So what are the potential beneﬁts of psychology? As we have argued throughout,
all models try to take some observations or intuitions about reality, provide an intuitive
explanation for them, and use that explanation to make additional predictions about
observable variables of interest. We see no reason to rule out such explanations simply
because they come from psychology.
Indeed, there is an argument for favoring such explanations, all else equal. Suppose
we have two models, both consistent with all the data we have and which make di erent
out of sample predictions. Suppose the two models are equally tractable in terms of
generating these out of sample predictions. Suppose one is consistent with psychologist’s
views of human decision–making and the other is not. Which would we prefer to use to
make predictions?
We have already argued that one may well prefer to use the more “intuitive” or the
more “plausible” model in such a situation, noting Kreps’ (1990) comment that this is
like a kind of data. The consistency with psychology can be another way of generating
such plausibility. It seems reasonable to believe that a psychotherapist who has seen
thousands of patients over a long period of time might develop a real understanding or
knowledge of things that are not easily quantiﬁed. If so, we can think of consistency with
the kinds of explanations such a person gives as a di erent kind of consistency with data.
In addition to a ecting the plausibility of competing predictions, psychological con-
siderations can suggest — indeed, have suggested — altogether new predictions. In some
cases, such as models of ambiguity aversion, the models economists have developed make
little direct use of psychology in motivating the formulation or assumptions. In other
cases, though, the “story” of the model explicitly incorporates ideas from psychology.
For example, consider Laibson’s (2001) notion of cue–based consumption. He ob-
serves that psychologists have identiﬁed situations where external inﬂuences act as cues
for various desires or cravings. He formalizes this idea through the existence of exoge-
nous, random observables which a ect the agent’s utility function and hence the agent’s
choices. He notes various new predictions that this model yields. For example, observ-
ing a billboard advertising cigarettes may lead someone trying to quit smoking to crave
23cigarettes and therefore to smoke. Note that Laibson’s model is based on a utility func-
tion and, in that sense, is an economist’s model. The point is that the restrictions on
the model — the e ect of the random observables — and the resulting predictions about
choice are motivated by psychology and would not have been considered otherwise.30
As evidence that psychology has been useful, we note the rapidly growing body of
research in economics and decision theory along these lines. While the extent of the
inﬂuence of psychology varies from the minimal to the extreme, the inﬂuence seems (to us)
clearly present in such papers as Eliaz and Spiegler (2008), Epstein (2008), Epstein and
Kopylov (2008), Kopylov and Noor (2009), Masatlioglu, Nakajima, and Ozbay (2009),
and Rubinstein and Salant (2008).
4.2 Nonchoice Data
In the previous subsection, we alluded to the possibility of using data which was not
generated by the choices of agents. While this seems anathema to the traditional notion
of revealed preference, why wouldn’t an economist want more data if it might help in
predicting choices? One reason some economists reject use of such data, we believe, is
that it is sometimes not clear how to interpret it.
For example, some recent empirical work (see Manski (2004)) asks agents what they
think the probability of some occurrence is. Some researchers (e.g., Blackburn, et al
(2008)) then assume that these agents maximize expected utility using the reported
probabilities. Even if (big if!) the agent can be predicted by subjective expected utility
and reports his true subjective probabilities, it is not clear that we should use his self–
reported beliefs to predict his behavior. As discussed in the previous subsection, it
is possible that the agent’s true utilities are state–dependent and hence that his true
subjective probabilities are not the ones we’d use for a state–independent representation.
On the other hand, the fact that certain data must be used with caution doesn’t imply
that it shouldn’t be used at all.
Beyond this, we conjecture that the economists who reject the use of nonchoice data
do so for two reasons. First, they focus on refutation as the sole means of model selection.
Second, they focus on predictions which only involve statements about behavior. Clearly,
if one adopts these two principles, there is no purpose in considering data which is not
about behavior. We argued at length above against an excessive focus on refutation. As
to the second principle, we do agree that the predictions of interest should be predictions
of behavior. However, a prediction of the form “if certain nonchoice variables take on
30Gul and Pesendorfer (2008) note that psychologists may desire break behavior into that which is
related to cues and that which isn’t in a way which is di erent from what would be most useful for
economists. We see this as a valid concern, but essentially orthogonal to our point.
24certain values, then certain choices will be made” strikes us as a prediction of behavior,
one for which nonchoice data would be crucial.31
The reality is that economists are typically faced with situations where many di erent
models ﬁt the available data and these models have di erent out of sample predictions.
In some cases, nonchoice data may help distinguish among these models.
For example, suppose we observe a child who chooses 6 pieces of chocolate over what
is described to him as “3 times 3” pieces and suppose we are trying to predict the
child’s choice between six and nine pieces. It seems natural to think that we would
ﬁnd information about the child’s last multiplication test useful. Similarly, Camerer,
Loewenstein, and Prelec (2004), henceforth CLP, note that observing that an agent does
not buy peanuts does not allow us to distinguish a mild dislike for peanuts from a life–
threatening allergy. Yet the di erence would be important for predicting a willingness to
accept money to eat peanuts or to consume food produced in the same factory as foods
containing peanuts. Nonchoice data, this time in the form of medical tests, would help
us predict their behavior.32
If we take nonchoice data seriously as relevant for predicting behavior, we’ll need
models that predict the relationship between behavior and these other variables and hence
we’ll want axioms that do the same.33 We already discussed the idea that psychological
considerations might motivate issues we consider and the models we use, in that indirect
sense, a ecting our axioms. Clearly, if we use psychological nonchoice data, the role of
psychology in suggesting hypotheses will be stronger.
4.3 What is a Good Axiomatization?
In the preceding sections, we commented extensively on what makes a good model or,
in the context of decision theory, a good representation of behavior. In this section,
we take a representation as given and ask what makes a good axiomatization for this
representation. Many of the same criteria we use for judging a model are again critical.
Recall that the purpose of a representation theorem is to add to our understanding of
and ability to test the model of the agent. In particular, the representation theorem gives
our statement of the predictions of the model about observable variables.
31Indeed, most empirical work does precisely this. If one is estimating the demand for ice cream on a
particular day in a particular place, surely one uses temperature as an explanatory variable. We don’t
think this point is controversial — if it is, we can’t see why.
32We interpret Gul and Pesendorfer’s (2008) criticique of CLP as arguing that the medical tests cannot
be used to refute or conﬁrm choice theory, a point we agree with. We do not believe (and are not sure
if Gul and Pesendorfer believe) that this implies nonchoice data is never helpful.
33See Caplin and Dean (2009) for some steps in this direction.
25Hence the ﬁrst thing a representation theorem must do is to identify the key behavior
which corresponds to the phenomenon being modeled, which sometimes requires a new
domain of behavior. While this step is very basic in a sense, many of the most funda-
mental developments in decision theory stem from an insightful approach to it. A classic
example in the theory of subjective expected utility is Ramsey’s (1926) observation that
if agents are subjective expected utility maximizers, then their preferences over bets will
reﬂect the subjective probabilities (for the state–independent “normalization”). Specif-
ically, if the agent prefers betting $1 if A occurs and 0 otherwise to $1 if B occurs and
0 otherwise, then the subjective probability of A is higher than that of B. This simple
insight was a key step in the development of Savage’s axiomatization.
As another example, Kreps’ (1979) study of the demand for ﬂexibility introduced
a new domain and the key property on that domain. Kreps recognized that decisions
about ﬂexibility could be thought of in terms of choice of a menu — that is, a partial
commitment regarding one’s future choices. The key axiom is then the formal statement
of a desire for ﬂexibility, speciﬁcally, that if one menu is a subset of another, then the
agent prefers the larger menu.34 Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) recognized that temptation
would induce the opposite — a demand for commitment instead of ﬂexibility — and thus
introduced the use of preferences over menus to study temptation. Their key behavioral
property is that agents prefer smaller menus in certain situations. Recognizing that non–
Bayesian updating induces an intertemporal inconsistency akin to temptation, Epstein
(2006) extended the domain to menus over (Anscombe–Aumann) acts and used this
richer domain to give a behavioral characterization of such updating.
Finally, we note that a creative development of a domain can itself be the key step.
For example, prior to the work of Kreps and Porteus (1978) and Segal (1990), every model
involving uncertainty and time implicitly assumed that only the probability distribution
over the information received at the time of an action choice was relevant. In particular,
as Kreps and Porteus emphasized, this assumes that the timing of the resolution of
uncertainty is irrelevant — if an agent can’t act till tomorrow afternoon regardless, then it
would not matter to him whether the uncertainty he faces is resolved tonight or tomorrow
morning. Similarly, as Segal emphasized, this assumes that a sequence of lotteries which
determine the agent’s consumption are equivalent to the agent to the overall lottery over
consumption they imply. Kreps–Porteus and Segal introduce models where one can make
these distinctions and hence illustrate the behavioral impact they have.35
Identifying the key behavior and the domain is the most essential step, but also the
step which is closest to an art. Thus we ﬁnd it di cult to tell the reader how to do it or
34Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2001) extend the domain considered by Kreps to allow for menus
of lotteries. In contrast to the other examples, this extension does not enable studying a novel form of
behavior but instead serves the role of enabling better identiﬁcation of the parameters in Kreps’ model.
35These models underlie the framework developed by Epstein and Zin (1989) to study asset demands
where risk aversion and consumption smoothing are identiﬁed separately.
26how to distinguish “good” choices from “bad.” In the rest of this section, we discuss a
number of simpler issues where it is much easier to o er some advice.
Since axiomatizations are supposed to state the predictions of the model about observ-
ables, the ﬁrst guideline is easy: axioms should be about variables of interest which are at
least potentially observable. Unfortunately, it is not always obvious which variables are
observable and many disagreements about axiomatizations hinge on such controversies.
For example, consider Caplin and Leahy (2001), whose axioms concern preferences over
lotteries over “psychological states” with a function which relates lotteries over physical
outcomes to lotteries over psychological outcomes. Our ﬁrst instinct is to argue that psy-
chological outcomes are not directly observed and the function relating these to physical
outcomes cannot be identiﬁed. On the other hand, we acknowledge that psychologists
and the authors may well disagree. Perhaps measurements of psychological outcomes
can be examples of the kind of nonchoice data we suggested earlier could be valuable.
By contrast, Caplin and Dean (2009) study nonchoice variables of interest that are more
naturally taken to be observable.
The second point is equally immediate: An axiomatization which does not say more
than the representation is not helpful. In some cases, the behavioral meaning of the
representation is obvious. We noted earlier that we don’t need an axiomatization to tell
us that u  > 0 represents “more is better.” In other cases, the behavioral meaning is
not obvious, but the key axioms are little more than a restatement of the representation.
For example, we mentioned our 2007 representation of temptation where an agent has
some probability beliefs regarding whether his future self will succumb to temptation.
Formally, this model represents the agent’s evaluation of a menu by the expected utility
of a certain probability distribution over items in the menu. We could have axiomatized
this model by making our main axiom the statement that for any menu, there is a lottery
over the items in the menu such that the agent is indi erent between the menu and the
lottery. This is indeed an implication of the model. On the other hand, this axiom just
says the representation in di erent words and so doesn’t tell us anything new.
Also, obviously, axioms should be simple and clearly interpretable. Otherwise, again,
the axioms have added nothing to our understanding. While it is di cult to deﬁne
simplicity, we note a few obvious guidelines. First, it is generally better to state axioms
in terms of the preferences, not a series of relations derived from the preference. For
example, a key in Savage’s representation theorem is the “more–likely–than” relation,
which is constructed from the preference relation. Yet Savage states his axioms in terms
of the preference, not in terms of the derived relation, since the preference is what we
are making predictions about. Second, axioms involving existential quantiﬁers are often
too complex to be interpreted in this sense. It is hard to get an intuition about an axiom
that says that an object exists with certain properties.36 Finally, as noted in Section 2, it
36Mixture continuity is a notable (though untestable) exception.
27is desirable to have axioms that are familiar, either because they are standard or because
they are intuitive variations on standard axioms. Obviously, it is easier to understand
the familiar. Also, this approach makes it easier to compare the new model to existing
work and see what it adds of value to our understanding.
Since one role of axioms is to enable testing of the model, clearly, it is valuable to state
axioms in a way which make such testing easier. Many of our comments about clarity of
the axioms applies directly here. For example, this is another reason to avoid existential
quantiﬁers since it can be very di cult to test a statement of the form “there exists an
object with the following properties.” Also, statements of axioms which suggest how to
formulate experiments or otherwise identify key observations are particularly helpful.
Finally, we turn to several issues regarding the set of axioms as a whole. Just as
individual axioms should be as interpretable as possible, it is important to convey the
meaning of the group as well. An obvious point in this regard is that a representation
theorem with a very large number of axioms is not going to be as clear as one with a small
number. (Also, we suspect that if a model really requires a large number of axioms, there
are probably many issues being combined that should be treated separately.) Second, we
often ﬁnd that axioms stated in a conditional form (e.g., if a is preferred to b and b is
preferred to c, then a is preferred to c) are crucial to to keeping the stated properties clear.
By contrast, if all axioms take the form of universal statements (e.g., more is better), the
individual axioms may be clear but, except in trivial cases, we cannot imagine avoiding
a large and complex set of such axioms. Intuitively, conditional axioms allow us to make
many inferences from a few observations. Without such axioms, we have to e ectively
list all preference statements.
A more di cult principle to adhere to is to state the set of axioms in a way which
enables the reader to see the role of each piece in generating the representation. This
makes the analysis more informative. However, there is typically a great deal of in-
teraction among axioms, making this hard to do. Indeed, if there were no interaction,
arguably, this would indicate that this representation is mixing multiple issues together.
An additional tension is that theorems with interactions among the axioms are often
more elegant and mathematically interesting.
An easier but still nontrivial principle is to clearly separate the axioms intended to be
relatively realistic and/or statements of the main focus from axioms intended primarily
as useful simpliﬁcations. While this sounds easy enough, in practice, the “innocuous”
simpliﬁcations can have unexpected substantive implications. For example, in Gul and
Pesendorfer’s (2001) paper on temptation, it is natural to read their “behavioral” axiom
as the property they call set betweenness and to view their other axioms as useful but
inessential simpliﬁcations. However, they show in Gul and Pesendorfer (2005) that inde-
pendence buys more than the simpliﬁcation of a linear structure. Indeed, Dekel, Lipman,
28and Rustichini (2009) give an example of intuitive temptation behavior that is ruled out
in their model not by set betweenness, but by the combination of set betweenness and
independence.37
Finally, a tricky issue is whether the axiom should be stated in a strong form or a weak
one. Suppose an axiom can be divided into two parts, one part of which is already implied
by the other axioms and one of which isn’t. Is it better to only state the nonredundant
part or to state the whole axiom? Often, the stronger form of the axiom is much more
intuitive, while, by deﬁnition, only the nonredundant part is really relevant. Usually,
we ﬁnd it’s best to state both and explain the point. We ﬁnd this particularly true of
continuity axioms where the weakest possible form of the axiom is often mathematically
very complex. Since such axioms are not testable, we think it’s usually best to state such
axioms in the simplest form, not the weakest.
On the same subject, we note that weaker axioms are not per se better axioms. If one
uses very weak assumptions to get a weak result, it’s not clear the exercise is useful. On
the other hand, if one uses weak assumptions to get a strong result, this is surely either
because the strong result is weaker than it appears or the assumptions are stronger than
they appear.38
5 Conclusion: Welfare Economics
We conclude this paper with a brief discussion of a topic we are reluctant to omit but have
relatively little to say about. When it comes to prescriptive analysis, prediction of choices
is insu cient. We must also have some principled way to identify the welfare implications
of choices. Traditionally, economists have assumed that choice reveals utility or welfare
directly. That is, if an agent chooses A over B, this implies he is better o  consuming
A than consuming B. Of course, as soon as we consider models where agents have
di culties in making good decisions and hence may make mistakes, such an assumption
seems rather inappropriate.
Gul and Pesendorfer (2008) take the position that even welfare economics is only
predictive, not prescriptive. For example, they suggest that results about whether a par-
ticular institution leads to Pareto optimal outcomes should not be seen as determining
whether the institution is socially valuable. Instead, this should be seen as a charac-
37Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini maintain an independence axiom, but have some discussion of why
this is not an innocuous simpliﬁcation. For related discussions, see also Fudenberg and Levine (2006)
and Noor and Takeoka (2009).
38On the other hand, if the misperception of the strength of the assumption or conclusion is widespread,
such a theorem could be very instructive.
29terization of whether the institution is likely to be long–lived. If there is some other
institution which leads to Pareto preferred outcomes, then this statement, they argue,
should be interpreted as saying that agents are likely to eventually switch to such an
alternative.
While their predictive point is quite reasonable, it seems clear that many economists
want to know what useful guidance welfare economics can give to policymakers. It
seems plausible that at least some policymakers in at least some settings have some
perhaps limited desire to choose policies that will beneﬁt citizens. If we take this perhaps
insu ciently cynical point of view seriously, what advice can we give such policymakers?39
Unfortunately, it is vastly more di cult to prescribe than to predict. Given how
poorly economists do at prediction, this should be troubling! Prescription is more di cult
than prediction because we need to know more than what people will do; we also need
to know what really determines their well–being. If we do not have the usual revealed
preference to identify this, what do we fall back on?
In some sense, this question is surely unsolvable. We cannot imagine how one could
ever conclusively prove that a particular outcome is better than another for a particular
person. On the other hand, reacting to this di culty by giving up on the problem instead
of accepting less than conclusive proof seems to give up too quickly. For example, Koszegi
and Rabin (2008) discuss observations of a gambler betting on tosses of a coin. Suppose
we saw this gambler betting more heavily on tails after a string of heads. Such behavior
would strongly suggest that the gambler is subject to the gambler’s fallacy, that is, the
belief that a string of heads is likely to be followed by a tail. As Koszegi and Rabin
note, our observation cannot prove this. In principle, it could simply be that the agent
values income in a state of the world where tails follows multiple heads more than in
a state of the world where there has been only a single toss which came up tails. Yet
this alternative explanation seems highly implausible. Thus it seems most natural to
explain the behavior as a mistake and to consider policies that beneﬁt the gambler based
on this hypothesis. On the other hand, if the gambler’s “mistake” is because he enjoys
believing he will win, would policies that interfere with his gambling necessarily improve
his welfare?
We ﬁnd it di cult to o er guidelines for when normative conclusions should be based
on revealed preference and when they should not or for identifying useful policies when
revealed preference fails. For example, if a person tries to ﬁnd ways to commit himself to
a particular course of action (losing weight, saving money) and expresses frustration over
his lack of success at this commitment, then it seems plausible that social interference
39As Gul and Pesendorfer (2007) note, if policymakers have well–deﬁned objectives over outcomes,
they only need our predictions. Our comments here are focused on the possibility that their objective is
to make citizens “better o ” and the di culty in deﬁning what that means.
30with this person might improve his well being. But it is not always obvious which actions
express this person’s “true” welfare. Is it the attempts to commit or the fact that these
attempts were unsuccessful (and therefore possibly half–hearted)? While we don’t argue
against all policies that interfere with individual choices, our inclination in the face of
doubt is to avoid such interference.
We note that numerous authors have made interesting attempts to resolve this prob-
lem and we refer the interested reader to their papers. See, for example, Bernheim and
Rangel (2007, 2009, forthcoming), Chambers and Hayashi (2008), and Noor (2009).
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